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EXAMINING THE CURRENT STATE OF




On the evening of May 13, 2010, Fort Eustis in Virginia hosted
an installment of a Commanding General's Spiritual Fitness Concert
Series featuring the band BarlowGirl.' The band describes itself on its
website as "tender-hearted, beautiful young women who aren't afraid to
take an aggressive, almost warrior-like stance when it comes to
spreading the gospel and serving God."2 Among those in attendance that
evening were men and women of A Company, 1st Batallion, 222nd
Aviation Regiment, with the notable exception of eighty soldiers,
including Private Anthony Smith. 3
These soldiers, who opted out when told the unit would be
attending the concert as a group, were marched back to the barracks and
placed on "lockdown," where their activities were restricted - according
to Smith, they were given orders to clean and were barred from sitting
down on their beds or using cell phones or other electronic devices for
4
the evening. When Smith and eight other soldiers sought to file a
complaint with Equal Opportunity officers in their chain of command,
they were met with resistance and dissuaded from filing a formal
. Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012.
The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their support throughout the
writing process, the First Amendment Law Review editorial staff for their time and
proofreading abilities, and Professors William P. Marshall and Eric L. Muller for
their input and insights.
1. Joe Gould, Soldiers Allege Punishment over Christian Concert, ARMY
TIMES (Springfield, Va.), Sept. 6, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 18650062.
2. BarlowGirl.com, About BarlowGirl, http://www.barlowgirl.com/about (last
visited Apr. 14, 2011).
3. Gould, supra note 1.
4. Id.
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complaint, until only Smith and one other soldier persisted in their
complaints. "The religion thing being shoved down my throat is really
something that doesn't work for me," Smith told Army Times. "As far as
what I believe, I believe there's something out there, but it's a really
personal thing with me. If I have a relationship with God or that entity, it
is not anybody's business, ever."' While the Army conducted an
investigation into the incident, the Military Religious Freedom
Foundation, and its founder, Mikey Weinstein, prepared a federal lawsuit
on behalf of Smith and another soldier, who is remaining anonymous.
The delicate balance between individual liberty and national
security is perhaps most clearly expressed in the governance and policies
of the United States Armed Forces. In theory, those serving in our citizen
military should have the same rights and freedoms that are granted to
their civilian counterparts - the rights and freedoms found in the
Constitution they fight to defend. The courts, however, have determined
that the efficient and disciplined operation of a national defense force
requires a different standard that may occasionally set greater constraints
on those rights.7 In defining those standards, courts, and especially the
United States Supreme Court, have largely remained silent, seeing it
sufficient to grant broad deference to the Department of Defense and
individual military branches to set policy, with redirection of their policy
coming not from the bench but from the legislature. As a result, the
military has seen fit to curtail rights that do not necessarily fall within the
purview of efficient institutional operation - particularly with regard to
freedom of religion. Religious toleration in the military has arisen as a
controversial matter numerous times over the past century,10 and it has
been raised again by the recent efforts of the Military Religious Freedom
Foundation, an advocacy organization leveling serious charges of undue
religious coercion such as those outlined above.II While the organization
has not yet been successful in gaining traction in the courts, with most of
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 93-125 and accompanying text.
11. See Military Religious Freedom Foundation, Legal,
http://militaryreligiousfreedom.org/legal (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
its litigation getting dismissed early in the trial stages, the situations of
the soldiers who are represented by the organization demonstrate how
tenuous religious freedom can be in the military.
Indeed, if the allegations described in Private Smith's case are
true, they appear, even to a casual observer, to be fairly serious violations
of an individual's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, as
well as prohibitions on a government-established church.1 3 So why have
the courts dismissed such claims? Is there a situation in which a military
religion case could be properly advanced, and if such a case were to
make it to the Supreme Court, would the court have the ability to break
its trend of general deference to military operations?
This Note argues that, given the right case, the Court could and
should take up the issue of religious toleration in the military and that the
Court should require greater oversight of the military command
structure's protection of the individual rights of those serving in the
armed forces. Part I briefly outlines the controversies raised and
approaches taken by the Military Religious Freedom Foundation, the
latest activist organization to challenge the military's practices. Part II
explores the history of the Court's interpretation of religious freedoms,
both inside the military and in civilian life and seeks to articulate the
Court's current stance on military religious freedom and the military's
policy response. Part III returns to the litigation aided by the Military
Religious Freedom Foundation, attempting to determine how future legal
action might be retooled to survive and even prevail in the federal
judicial system. The Note concludes that if the Supreme Court were
faced with a properly argued case, it could reasonably take a less
deferential stance toward the military than it has in the past, given the
12. See Gould, supra note 1.
13. See Editorial, Military Proselytizing: Plain Wrong, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Oct. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 20240646. The Editorial noted:
If the investigation into the matter determines that soldiers
were indeed punished for not attending a faith-based event,
then the Pentagon should make an example out of those
responsible. Members of the armed forces should not be forced
to believe anything, except that trying to impose their beliefs
on others will get them in trouble.
Id. Of course, this editorial is just one common lay interpretation of what is
guaranteed by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The nuance and
ambiguity of each will be discussed later in this Note.
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recent recognition of certain constitutional protections of religious
freedom, the current controversies and concerns being voiced, and those
looming on the horizon.
I. CURRENT CONTROVERSY: THE MILITARY RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
FOUNDATION
Founded in 2006, 14 the Military Religious Freedom Foundation
(MRFF) declares in its mission statement that it is "dedicated to ensuring
that all members of the United States Armed Forces fully receive the
Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom to which they and all
Americans are entitled by virtue of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment," believing that "religious faith is a Constitutionally
guaranteed freedom that must never be compromised, except in the most
limited of military circumstances, because of its fundamental importance
to the preservation of the American nation and the American way of life"
and that "no American has the right to question another American's
beliefs as long as they do not unwontedly intrude on the public space or
the privacy or safety of another individual."15 Its leader, Mikey
Weinstein, is a 1977 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy
who served 10 years of active duty as a JAG officer before working as an
assistant general counsel in the Reagan White House.16 He was later
employed as general counsel to Ross Perot before founding MRFF.17
Weinstein has spent the ensuing years raising challenges both great and
small on religious freedom in the armed forces, each time gaining a
higher profile, more supporters, and more active-duty military
14. Military Religious Freedom Foundation, Michael L. "Mikey" Weinstein,
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/about/michael-l-mikey-weinstein (last
visited Apr. 14, 2011).
15. Military Religious Freedom Foundation, Our Mission,
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/about/our-mission (last visited Apr. 14,
2011). Interestingly, the mission statement does not specifically mention the Free
Exercise Clause. See id
16. Military Religious Freedom Foundation, supra note 14. See also Jeff
Sharlet, Jesus Killed Mohammed: The Crusade for a Christian Military, HARPER'S
MAG., May 2009, at 31, 36.
17. Military Religious Freedom Foundation, supra note 14.
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"clients."18 He also attracts a great deal of controversy and outright
hatred from his targets, both real and perceived, stemming largely from
his outspoken, media-savvy persona embodied in statements such as his
declaration that "[t]his country is facing a pervasive and pernicious
pattern and practice of unconstitutional rape of the religious rights of our
armed forces members," a process he refers to as "soul rape."
Between the bold statements and fiery rhetoric, there lies little
actual litigation. Most of the MRFF and Weinstein's battles are played
out in the court of public opinion, through press releases and television
appearances designed to stoke outrage among those sympathetic to his
cause.2 0 There have been some instances, however, in which the MRFF
went so far as to sue the Department of Defense on behalf of various
atheist soldiers claiming violations of religious freedom. In March 2008,
the MRFF filed suit on behalf of Specialist Jeremy Hall in federal court
in Kansas, after Hall was sent home early from Iraq due to threats from
fellow soldiers.21 The harassment stemmed from Hall's efforts to
organize a meeting of the Military Association of Atheists and
Freethinkers at Camp Speicher in Iraq in July 2007.22 At the meeting, he
was accosted by an officer, Major Freddy J. Welborn, who, according to
Hall's sworn statement, informed Hall that "[p]eople like you are not
holding up the Constitution and are going against what the founding
fathers, who were Christians, wanted for America!" 23 Major Welborn
also threatened to bar Hall's reenlistment and bring charges against Hall
and a fellow soldier in attendance.24 Mistrustful of his superior officers,
Hall declined to pursue a complaint with the Army's Equal Opportunity
Office and chose instead to contact the leadership of the Military
18. Sharlet, supra note 16, at 36-37 (listing among Weinstein's victories a
Department of Defense investigation into six Pentagon officials who appeared in
uniform in a video for Christian Embassy, an elite fundamentalist ministry operation,
and the adoption of religious diversity classes into the curriculum at the Air Force
Academy).
19. Id. at 37.
20. See Military Religious Freedom Foundation, Media,
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/media-events/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
21. Neela Banerjee, Soldier Sues Army, Saying His Atheism Led to Threats,
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Association of Atheists and Freethinkers, which put him in contact with
Weinstein and the MRFF.25 Weinstein sees Hall's decision as a common
one, arguing that the low number of fifty formal complaints received by
the Pentagon since 2005 stems from mistrust and fear of retribution from
superiors.26 "Religion is inextricably intertwined with [soldiers'] jobs,"
Weinstein said to The New York Times. "You're promoted by who you
pray with."27 Government attorneys with the Justice Department
responded to Hall's suit with a motion to dismiss, arguing that Hall
lacked standing to sue the Pentagon before exhausting military remedies
to his complaints. 28 "Judicial review would significantly interfere with
Army operations and intrude on disciplinary and personnel decisions
entrusted to military judgment," the government wrote in a supporting
29 1memorandum to its motion. "[T]he Army was deprived of the
opportunity to promptly investigate the alleged misconduct and take
appropriate disciplinary action."30
While Weinstein protested the motion to dismiss, calling it
"ludicrous to go through the chain of command" due to the pervasiveness
of religious influence, 3 1 Hall voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit in October
2008 before further action could be taken.32 Hall and MRFF cited Hall's
plans to leave the Army the following spring as the predominant reason
for the dismissal, in turn avoiding further legal wrangling over standing
in federal court once he was no longer in the Army.33 This did not end




28. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Hall v. Welborn, No. 08-2098 (D.
Kan. July 8, 2008), available at http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org
/legalfiles/MOTTODISMISS.pdf.
29. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 3, Hall v.
Welborn, No. 08-2098 (D. Kan. July 8, 2008), available at
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/legalfiles/MEMOINSUPPORT.pdf
30. Id. at 1.
31. John Milburn, Government seeks dismissal of soldier's suit, ASSOCIATED
PRESS ALERT, July 10, 2008, available at Westlaw.
32. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 1, Hall v. Welborn, No. 08-2098 (D. Kan.
Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org
/legalfiles/dismissal sep08.pdf.
33. John Milburn, Kansas atheist soldier drops lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ALERT, Oct. 10, 2008, available at Westlaw.
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legal proceedings against the Department of Defense on behalf of a
second plaintiff, Dustin Chalker, a soldier stationed at Fort Riley in
Kansas.3 4 Chalker, also an atheist, cited numerous events between
December 2007 and May 2008 that he was required to attend and at
which Christian prayers were delivered. 3 5 Additionally, the lawsuit
places Chalker's incidents as part of a larger pattern of specific
discrimination by fundamentalist Christians in the armed forces pressing
their views upon subordinates, most notably in the endorsement of a
"spiritual handbook" for soldiers by General David Petraeus.36 The
Department of Justice again sought dismissal in response in April 2009,
primarily on the same grounds of standing used against Hall, contending
that Chalker did not pursue his claims aggressively enough within the
military before resorting to a civil suit. 3 7 Furthermore, the Department of
Justice's response suggests the specific prayer complaints attack a
tradition of military religious observances dating back to the
Revolutionary War, and that Chalker's allegations of a larger systematic
pattern of religious endorsement are "precisely the kind of generalized
grievances that are routinely rejected by the federal courts."38 Indeed, on
January 7, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas granted the motion to dismiss, finding "plaintiffs' claims are
nonjusticiable because plaintiffs did not exhaust intramilitary remedies
... [therefore] this case should be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction."39
34. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Chalker v. Gates, No. 08-2467-KHV-
JPO (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org
/legalfiles/complainsept08.pdf.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 5. The book, Under Orders: A Spiritual Handbook for Military
Personnel, written by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel William McCoy, "mak[es] the
case for the necessity of religion - preferably Christian - for a properly
functioning military unit." Sharlet, supra note 16, at 35. Gen. Petraeus' endorsement
reads "Under Orders should be in every rucksack for those moments when Soldiers
need spiritual energy." Id. When pressed by MRFF, the General claimed this was a
private communication between two Christian soldiers taken out of context. Id. at
35-36.
37. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 6-25,
Chalker v. Gates, No. 08-2467-KHV-JPO (D. Kan. Apr. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/legalfiles/dojchalker.pdf.
38. Id. at 2-3.
39. Memorandum and Order at 2, Chalker v. Gates, No. 08-2467-KHV-JPO
(D. Kan. Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org
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In filing its motion to dismiss, the Justice Department turned the
question before the courts from one of the merits of Specialist Chalker's
First Amendment claims to one of federal jurisdiction. Was this a case
the court could even consider? In finding the claims nonjusticiable
because intramilitary remedies had not been exhausted, the district court
essentially found a lack of ripeness to Chalker's case. As defined by
constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, "the ripeness doctrine seeks
to separate matters that are premature for review because the injury is
speculative and may never occur, from those cases that are appropriate
for federal court action."40 While Chalker has indeed suffered injury that
he has standing to contest, the court does not recognize an injury as
having occurred until the military has conclusively failed to act on his
complaints.4 1
The Military Religious Freedom Foundation's pending matters
as of April 2011, including the one involving Private Smith that was
noted above, are only in the preliminary stages and, thus, the question
persists whether cases of the sort brought by Hall and Chalker are in fact
addressing violations of their religious freedoms in the military setting. If
they had indeed gone through the ranks of the military command, would
their grievances have been redressed at some point along the line? Or, as
Weinstein seems to suggest in his portrait of pervasive Christian
religious culture in the armed forces, would Hall and Chalker have been
pressured to relent, and their grievances swept under the rug, before the
matters were ripe for consideration by the federal courts? If the latter
were true, could the court then find ripeness in the face of this evidence
and intervene to protect Hall and Chalker's First Amendment rights? The
answers to these questions require an examination of the tense
relationships, contrasts, and contradictions that exist between civilian and
military First Amendment protection, between speech rights broadly and
religious rights specifically, and even between the religion clauses of the
First Amendment.
/legalfiles/chalkerdismissalfiling.pdf.
40. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4.1 (5th ed. 2007).
41. See Memorandum and Order, supra note 39, at 11-13.
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II. HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN THE MILITARY
A comprehensive overview of the precedent leading up to the
current state of the law on religious toleration in the military requires the
analysis of three distinct strands of cases: those concerning the religious
freedoms of the civilian population, those concerning the broader First
Amendment rights of members of the military, and finally, those directly
addressing religious freedoms within the military. From there, one can
see how those decisions have influenced the development of military
policy on religious accommodation and freedom from coercion and
whether this policy has been effective in addressing the religious rights
of service members.
A. The Establishment Clause Cases: Developing a Doctrine of
Accommodation
The earliest Establishment Clause cases appeared in the schools,
with arguments that established the limitations of strict separation
imposed by the Free Exercise Clause, essentially claiming that in order to
exercise faith freely, religious persons require some minimal degree of
accommodation from the government. In Zorach v. Clauson,42 the
Supreme Court upheld a program of "released time" religious instruction
in the New York Public Schools, in which students were released from
school with parental permission to receive off-site religious instruction.43
In its reasoning, the Court distinguished the New York program from the
Illinois program it previously overturned in McCollum v. Board of
Education," noting that the program in McCollum utilized public school
facilities for religious instruction, while the Zorach program's religious
instruction took place exclusively at off-site religious centers.45 To the
three dissenting Justices in Zorach, however, this distinction was not
enough to free the program from being a state endorsement of religion
46
through coercion. In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter shifted the
attention from those students who attended religious education to those
42. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
43. Id. at 308-09.
44. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
45. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308-09.
46. Id. at 316-17 (Black, J., dissenting).
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who chose not to participate: "The pith of the case is that formalized
religious instruction is substituted for other school activity which those
who do not participate in the released-time program are compelled to
attend."47 He quoted the appellants as alleging that this scenario
"inevitably results in the exercise of pressure and coercion upon parents
and children to secure attendance by the children for religious
instruction." 4 8 According to Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, this
opinion and its dissent worked respectively to justify and establish the
limits of a concept of religious accommodation, in which principles of
Free Exercise are used to argue that strict separation between church and
state undermines individual religious liberties. 49  "Under [the
accommodation concept's view of] history, the founders' decision not to
establish a national church went hand-in-hand with a general agreement
that religion deserves great respect in the polity," they wrote.so "Through
accommodation of religion, the government demonstrates respect for the
religious lives of its people."
Later, in the case of School District of Abington Township v.
52Schempp, the Court further defined the limitations of religious
accommodation, holding unconstitutional the practice of prayer and bible
reading as part of daily announcements in a public school.53 While the
majority opinion focused on the clear violation of religious neutrality,54
Justice Brennan's concurrence explored the school officials' defense that
the practice was a form of religious accommodation, using the military
55
chaplaincy as a point of permissible accommodation for comparison.
Justice Brennan noted two primary distinguishing features that set
chaplains apart from school prayer, in prisons as well as in the military.
First, military and prison chaplains are voluntary resources for those who
seek them out, while students are coerced into listening to prayer during
47. Id at 321 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The
Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 105 (2007).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
53. Id. at 205-07, 223.
54. Id. at 223-25.
55. Id. at 296-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the announcements. Second, chaplains are provided as a service to
prisoners and service members as a result of their being isolated from
their religious communities, serving as a point of access where there
ordinarily would not be one.57 The legal obligation to attend school, on
the other hand, puts no such restriction on students' access to religious
exercise. Justice Brennan's concurrence confirmed the fine balancing
act that an accommodation view of the Establishment Clause required:
permitting free exercise while hedging against any activities that would
serve as a coercive influence.
B. The Free Exercise Cases: A Definitional Divide
While the Establishment Clause cases grappled with how much
respect government could affirmatively grant to religion, Free Exercise
jurisprudence concerned itself with statutes that negatively impacted
religious activity. In the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner,5 9 the Supreme
Court declared for the first time that violations of an individual's right to
free exercise of religion will be subject to strict scrutiny, holding that a
Seventh Day Adventist was eligible for unemployment benefits after
losing her job for being unable to work on Saturday, which was
considered in her faith to be the Sabbath.60 Thus, in order for a state actor
to infringe upon an individual's religious practice, it would need a
compelling reason to do so in order for it to be constitutionally
permissible. This standard held sway in the Court for decades and even
62
seemed to be expanded to areas outside the workplace setting.
56. Id. at 298-99.
57. Id. at 299.
58. Id.
59. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
60. Id. at 399-403.
61. Id. at 406-09.
62. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707 (1981) (holding that an employee who quits on the grounds of religious
objection is entitled to unemployment benefits); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (holding that Amish families were not required to send their children to
school past eighth grade).
2011] 723
In 1990, the Court's ruling in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith63 dispensed with the compelling interest
test in determining the permissibility of religious use of peyote. 4 Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia declared that a compelling interest test
permitted man "'to become a law unto himself, and, in a pluralistic
society such as the United States, allowing religious beliefs to be a
means for contravening established law "would be courting anarchy."6 6
Instead, he saw the test as being whether the law in question was neutral
and of general applicability and designed to prohibit socially harmful
67
conduct. If these standards were met, the state was free to infringe upon
religious expression by way of the law, regardless of whether or not a
compelling reason to infringe was present.68
Scalia's new interpretation of free exercise in Employment
Division v. Smith was controversial, criticized by concurring justices
within the opinion itself,69 and by legal scholars after the fact.70 Vincent
Phillip Mufioz noted that the Employment Division v. Smith case created
a divide over the true originalist interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause.71 One side, represented by Justice O'Connor, relied on the
scholarship of Judge Michael McConnell and argued for the Sherbert
interpretation. Under this interpretation, religion is privileged conduct
absent a compelling government interest, with evidence of the Founders'
intention found in the form of pre- and post-Revolutionary state
63. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4 (1993)).
64. Id. at 884-85.
65. Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
66. Id. at 888.
67. Id. at 884-85.
68. Id.
69. See id at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (writing that the
"holding dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence,
appears unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our
Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty").
70. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990) (criticizing the opinion's use of
legal sources as well as its theoretical argument).
71. Vincent Phillip Mufloz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. Pot'Y 1083,
1083-84 (2008).
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constitutions, as well as supplementary writings of James Madison.72 The
other interpretation, championed by Justice Scalia and aligned with the
work of "distinguished church-state scholar" Philip Hamburger, asserted
that while the law could accommodate religion, generally applicable laws
that indirectly burdened religion were permissible and not all religious
practices held absolute Constitutional protection.73
The Court reaffirmed its decision three years later, once again
rejecting the compelling interest test in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.74 At this point, Congress decided to intervene with
the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),75
designed to "restore the compelling interest test" and to "guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened."76 The Supreme Court responded in its 1997 ruling in City of
Boerne v. Flores,7 7 which severely restricted the enforceability of the
Act. The Court found that the use of RFRA to challenge the denial of a
permit to build a church in San Antonio, Texas, was unconstitutional
because while Congress insisted the Fourteenth Amendment made RFRA
applicable to the states, "[1]egislation which alters the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress
does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."
Thus, enforcing RFRA's interpretation of religious freedom upon the
states over the Court's interpretation in Employment Division v. Smith
was not seen as a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under § 5 to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal
government, however, remained subject to RFRA, a fact that the Court
72. Id. at 1087-95.
73. Id. at 1095-97.
74. 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (holding that a city ordinance against animal
slaughter was unconstitutional not for lack of compelling interest but because it
unfairly targeted the Santeria religion).
75. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb to bb-4 (1993)).
76. Id.
77. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
78. Id. at 519.
79. Id.
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confirmed in their 2006 ruling in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal.so
C. Free Speech and the Military
Historically, the Court has treated First Amendment free speech
issues broadly in the military setting, providing deference to the
Department of Defense based largely on the reasoning that the military
necessity doctrine - the idea that the unique task of national defense and
maintaining discipline and order in the military - allows for a narrower
reading of First Amendment rights than what would apply to the general
public. This principle is illustrated by Orloff v. Willoughby, a case
concerning an Army doctor who alleged that his commission was denied
due to suspect affiliations with Communist organizations in his past.
Justice Jackson wrote in the opinion that "judges are not given the task of
running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels through
which such grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the
Congress and upon the President of the United States and his
subordinates. "8 In essence, the Court chose not to rule one way or the
other on whether the Army's action was discriminatory and instead
delegated the question to the exclusive authority of the military's own
disciplinary and appeals system.84
A case hewing even more closely to free exercise and expression
of morality, if not religion directly, Parker v. Levy, 5 concerned an Army
doctor who felt orders to train Special Forces soldiers would violate his
medical ethics and disobeyed them.86 This act of principled protest led to
80. 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (concerning the federal seizure of a Schedule I
controlled substance found in a sacramental tea used by a New Mexico branch of the
Brazilian church Uniio do Vegetal). The Court held that the RFRA compelling
interest test determined the government's burden and, applying that test, found that
the government failed to meet its burden. Id. at 439.
81. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
82. Id. at 85, 89-90.
83. Id. at 93-94.
84. Id.
85. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
86. Id. at 735-37.
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his being court-martialed, convicted, and confined for three years with
hard labor. As then-Justice Rehnquist explained:
While the members of the military are not excluded
from the protection granted by the First
Amendment, the different character of the military
community and of the military mission requires a
different application of those protections. The
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the
consequent necessity for imposition of discipline,
may render permissible within the military that
which would be constitutionally impermissible
outside it.88
The idea that the standard for First Amendment protections
applied to military personnel is lower than that applied to civilians has
since served as a rationale to uphold military decisions in several other
cases. 89 In the words of Andrew C.S. Efaw: "The Court's decisions
clearly hold the military to be a society apart, treating the armed forces'
need for a disciplined, cohesive fighting force as justification for the loss
of liberty of individual soldiers." 9 0 Furthermore, in assessing military
free speech cases as a whole, C. Thomas Dienes noted that there is a
"marked resemblance" between them. He finds a lack of balancing or
"explor[ing] the first amendment interests burdened by the military
regulation," with the courts choosing to instead "denigrate competing
first amendment concerns . . . invoke justiciability concerns,
emphasizing the dominant constitutional roles of Congress and the
87. Id. at 736.
88. Id. at 758.
89. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulation
requiring approval from the base commander before circulating political petitions).
See also Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994) (upholding the constitutional
validity of the military justice system with regard to the Appointments Clause and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296 (1983) (denying a damages remedy for claims by military personnel that
constitutional rights had been violated by superior officers).
90. Andrew C.S. Efaw, Comment, Free Exercise and the Uniformed
Employee: A Comparative Look at Religious Freedom in the Armed Forces of the
United States and Great Britain, 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 648, 656 (1996).
91. C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment is Not Preferred: The
Military and Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 779, 815 (1988).
2011] 727
728 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW rvol. 9
Executive in controlling the military and the lack of judicial capabilities
... [and] stress the unique and special needs of the military." 9 2 Overall,
in terms of free speech broadly understood, the Court has taken the
stance that its hands are tied in such a way that even contemplating the
interests involved would infringe on the military's expertise in such
matters.
D. Religious Freedom and the Military
While much of the case law on religious freedoms in the military
setting has followed the same pattern of deference to congressional and
executive authority as other free speech cases, there have been some
notable exceptions, and furthermore, instances of legislative intervention
after the Court declined to act. Perhaps the most frequently cited cases
involving religious expression in the military are those involving use of
religious dress while in uniform. The issue was first addressed by the
Ninth Circuit in the 1980 case of Sherwood v. Brown,93 which upheld the
court-martial of a Sikh sailor who refused to wear a helmet instead of his
turban. 94 This holding was not explicitly based on religious rights,
however, but rather in safety, affirming the District Court's conclusion
that "the Navy's interest in safety was sufficient to meet the compelling
need requirement," since "'[a]ll personnel at battle stations wear helmets
to protect themselves from missiles such as shrapnel and to cushion their
impact with bulkheads and overheads caused by a lurching vessel."'9 5
Therefore, the military status of the plaintiff did not play into the court's
decision, as it held the regulation against the same compelling need
standard used for civilians.
In 1986, the Supreme Court addressed religious dress for
members of the military directly in Goldman v. Weinberger,9 6 upholding
military policy that prohibited an Orthodox Jewish soldier from wearing
92. Id.
93. 619 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 48.
95. Id.
96. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). See also Bitterman v. Sec'y of Def., 553 F. Supp. 719
(D.D.C. 1982) (upholding military policy in a nearly identical case heard earlier by a
district court).
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his yarmulke while in uniform. 97 Unlike in Sherwood, this ruling was
based not upon the compelling interest of safety but rather on the need to
"foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps,"98
further arguing that "courts must give great deference to the professional
judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a
particular military interest."9 9 In other words, while the courts might not
necessarily see this interest as compelling if applied to civilian life, the
particular nature and needs of the military in this instance required the
courts to defer to the military under the military necessity doctrine.
Congress, on the other hand, did not see it fit to defer to military
authority and eventually enacted a statute stating that members of the
armed forces "may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the
uniform of the member's armed force," 100 provided said item is "neat
and conservative. ,,0o Between this and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, the door seems, at least in theory, to be open to the
Court giving less deference to the military in religious freedom
decisions. There has not yet been an opportunity for this to play out.
What's more, while the House and Senate Judiciary Committees both
discussed the military context of RFRA before its passage, their
comments shed little light on how things would or could change. The
House Committee states that "examination of such regulations in light of
a higher standard does not mean the expertise and authority of [the]
military . . . will be necessarily undermined" 102 as military necessity
remains a compelling interest but also warns that "[s]eemingly
reasonable regulations based upon speculation, exaggerated fears of [sic]
thoughtless policies cannot stand. Officials must show that the relevant
regulations are the least restrictive means of protecting a compelling
governmental interest.""3 The Senate Judiciary Committee report then
further complicates matters by asserting that while the compelling
97. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10.
98. Id. at 507 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843-44 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
99. Id. (citing Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305; Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83,
93-94 (1953)).
100. 10 U.S.C. § 774(a) (2006).
101. Id. at § 744(b)(2).
102. H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 8 (1993).
103. Id.
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interest standard should be applied to the military, "the courts have
always extended to military authorities significant deference in
effectuating these interests. The committee intends and expects that such
deference will continue under this bill."'
Beyond the cases involving military dress, there are others in
which religious freedoms were upheld in a military setting, albeit in
situations that often set the two religious freedom clauses in the First
Amendment against one another. This is best exemplified in the case of
Katcoff v. Marsh,0 5 in which the Second Circuit upheld the military
chaplain system over the argument that it stood as a violation of the
Establishment Clause.106 The Court reasoned that the intention of the
program was not to establish a state church in violation of the First
Amendment, but rather to defend the First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion by providing soldiers with opportunities to
participate in their religious traditions while deployed.' 07 The Katcoff
opinion also upheld much of the judicial deference of the religious dress
cases, quoting Justice Jackson's words in Orloff regarding the distinct
nature of the military community.'os
Acting as a sort of balance to the Establishment-Free Exercise
tension found in Katcoff is the earlier case of Anderson v. Laird,109 heard
by the D.C. Circuit, which held that soldiers, even in the academic
settings of the service academies, cannot be forced to attend religious
ceremonies." 0 In separate opinions, two of the three judges found this
practice to be a firm violation of the Establishment Clause."' Chief
Judge Bazelon saw the issue as an absolute, without consideration for
military necessity: "Attendance at religious exercises is an activity which
under the Establishment Clause a government may never compel."12 In
104. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 12 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
1901.
105. 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 224. The court's opinion in this case quoted extensively from
Justice Brennan's concurrence in School District ofAbington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963). See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
107. Katcoff 755 F.2d at 231-32.
108. Id. at 233. See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1933).
109. 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
110. Id. at 284.
111. Id. at 283-84.
112. Id. at 285.
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his concurring opinion, Judge Leventhal gave more weight to the
military's needs, but nonetheless concluded that "[t]he government
simply has not made the required showing that its interference with
religious freedoms is compelled by, and goes no further than what is
compelled by, the effective training of military officers needed for
survival."" 3
The Supreme Court took up neither Katcoff nor Anderson, but
the cases set the tone for religious expression in the armed forces -
enough availability to permit Free Exercise but not a pervasive enough
presence to create compulsion and, thus, a violation of the Establishment
Clause. In other words, the balance is established between a freedom to
worship and a freedom from being coerced into any specific worship,
this time in the military setting. More recent cases have continued to
retain these basic boundaries, while adding further nuance that may
prove instructive in assessing current controversies.
In the 1995 case of Hartmann v. Stone,114 the Sixth Circuit took
on the issue of religious expression in the form of the Army Family
Child Care on-base daycare program. The court struck down a regulation
that prohibited providers of Army childcare from conducting religious
activities and practices in their facilities.' 15 Interestingly, in this case the
court did override the military necessity doctrine, asserting that the
discriminatory nature of the regulation against religious persons trumped
any compelling reason the military might have for the policy." 6 This was
in part because the providers within the Family Child Care program were
civilians, and thus the court saw the regulations restricting their religious
expression as extending outside the military's proper locus of control. I "
The fact that the military necessity doctrine did not hold sway, even if
only for the benefit of civilians working under a military program, may
demonstrate that there are in fact areas in which the military has no
compelling reason to be granted deference.
With regard to Establishment Clause issues, in 2003 the Fourth
Circuit held in Mellen v. Bunting"8 that mandatory evening prayers
113. Id. at 303 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
114. 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995).
115. Id. at 975.
116. Id. at 983-94.
117. Id. at 985.
118. 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
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conducted at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) violated the Clause
and constituted a state endorsement of religion." 9 In its analysis, the
court used tests established for religious presence in state-funded
institutions,120 as well as school prayer cases, 12 and determined that the
prayers were 'plainly religious in nature"'l22 and sent "the unequivocal
message that VMI, as an institution, endorses the religious expressions
embodied in the prayer."' 2 3 While school prayer has long been seen as a
coercive religious activity when conducted in this fashion, VMI's
adversative method of education, which "emphasizes the detailed
regulation of conduct and the indoctrination of a strict moral code,"
leaves its students "uniquely susceptible to coercion," making the
argument even stronger that students are "plainly coerced into
participating in a religious exercise.' 124 Although VMI is a Virginia state
college with close affiliation to the military, the argument that a coercive
environment such as VMI may enhance unauthorized endorsement of
religion while inhibiting those who feel their rights have been infringed
upon from speaking up is of particular note here, especially when one
recalls, for instance, how quickly those put on lockdown along with
Private Smith relented in their pursuit of filing a formal complaint.125
E. Interpretation ofReligious Freedom in Military Policy
The military, for its part, has made efforts to wisely use the
discretion granted to it by the courts. The Department of Defense
directive issued in response to the legislation on military dress after
Goldman, for instance, went beyond the immediate issue at hand in that
119. Id. at 374-75.
120. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating that prayer
in public institutions must have a secular purpose, must neither advance nor inhibit
religion, and must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion).
121. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (finding
student-led prayer at home football games violates the Establishment Clause); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that prayers at middle and high school
graduation ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause).
122. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41
(1980)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 371.
125. See supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
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case and developed a clear policy for military leadership to follow in
confronting all religious freedom issues.126 In addition to supplying
commanders with definitions for what constitutes "neat and
conservative" apparel, the directive plainly states that "[i]t is DoD policy
that requests for accommodation of religious practices should be
approved by commanders when accommodation will not have an adverse
impact on mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion,
standards, or discipline."l27
The policy is described in even greater detail in a November
1998 article in Army Lawyer, a publication written to assist Army
lawyers in performing their legal duties, in which Major Michael J.
Benjamin provides a clear analytical framework for military officers to
use in identifying and confronting religious freedom and accommodation
issues.128 Benjamin divides the article, both in case history and in issue
analysis, between accommodation/free exercise issues, establishment of
religion issues, and hybrid issues, reflecting the duality of religious
freedom in the Constitution and the balance between free exercise and
establishment discussed in Katcoff For issues regarding accommodation
of the free exercise of religion, Benjamin provides plain instructions to
"[r]esolve at the lowest possible level - presume accommodation," while
suggesting three preliminary criteria for consideration: sincerity, basis in
. . 129
religion, and impact on mission.
Establishment Clause problems are admittedly more difficult, as
there is no specific regulation in the military to use as a guide, and an
issue could arise in response to either a single isolated incident or a
larger policy decision.1 30 Benjamin focuses on four key problem areas
and provides a response for each. 131 First, all religious activities must be
126. See DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION No. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION OF
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES (Feb. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130017p.pdf.
127. Id. at 1-2. The same section notably is very specific in saying "The U.S.
Constitution proscribes Congress from enacting any law prohibiting the free exercise
of religion," implying that military regulations may not fall under that same
constitutional scope. Id.
128. Maj. Michael J. Benjamin, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue: Legal
Analysis ofReligion Issues in the Army, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1998, at 1.
129. Id. at 14.
130. Id. at 16.
13 1. Id.
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voluntary, free of even "[s]ubtle coercion and indirect rewards," and
"[n]on-belief or non-participation should not result in punishment."l 3 2
Second, the chaplain program (as well as all religious displays) must
strive to be as inclusive and service as many soldiers of different faiths
and denominations as possible.133 If a chaplain cannot provide a
particular religious service, he is responsible for finding someone who
134 . .. .
can. Third, military religious programming must be limited to
members of the military and their families and cannot provide religious
support of local civilian communities. 13 5 Finally, while military and
patriotic ceremonies are not to be conducted as religious services,
"invocations, prayers, and benedictions" are permitted, provided they
remain "relatively short and non-denominational" and do "not reference
divinity by any sectarian name (Jesus, Allah) but rather use 'generic'
terms (Father, Almighty, Source of Goodness)." 36
Finally, in hybrid cases - described as instances in which one
soldier contends that open discussion and evangelizing is a component of
his free exercise, while another feels that it violates his rights under the
Establishment Clause - Benjamin determines authority and rank to be
determinative factors. 137 If the evangelizing solider is a military superior,
his religious expression is likely to affect his subordinates; it is improper
if it either violates the standard of voluntariness discussed in the
Establishment Clause analysis or is perceived as coming from his
capacity as an official rather than as an individual, which would amount
to a government endorsement.m13 If the individual expressing his religion
is a peer or civilian, the issue falls more under free speech, and the
expression can be restricted by a superior if "'he perceives [it] to be a
clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops . . . under his
command."' 3 9 "The religious soldier cannot use the Free Exercise
Clause as a sword to protect his comments if they have a disruptive
132. Id
133. Id at 16-17.
134. Id. at 17.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 17. The article also notes that "[t]he Army chaplaincy apparently
does not have written rules that govern prayer at non-religious ceremonies. Guidance
is passed on through informal training and observation." Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 18 (quoting Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353 (1979)).
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effect on the unit,"1 4 0 the article summarizes. "Nor should the command
use the Establishment Clause to restrict religious comments, aside from
their effect on morale and cohesion."1
4 1
With such clear regulations, procedures, and analytical
framework, it is puzzling that contentious issues such as those alleged by
the Military Religious Freedom Foundation persist and are left almost
entirely unaddressed by military command. Two other major factors, that
are necessary to note, complicate the treatment of religious freedom in
the military. The first is that the bulk of the framework discussed above
is only one military lawyer's analysis of his branch's interpretation of the
Department of Defense directive, which itself was an interpretation of an
act of Congress.142 More significant, however, is the apparent lack of
oversight to ensure that such policies will be implemented properly. If a
commanding officer, or branch secretary, or even the Secretary of
Defense decided that the directives and policies regarding religious
freedom were not to his or her liking, what would prevent him or her
from ignoring them if Courts are unwilling to intervene in military
operations?
III. CURRENT CASES AND LEGAL STRATEGIES
Turning back to the recently dismissed and potential future
lawsuits filed by the Military Religious Freedom Foundation, several
relevant points emerge in light of the preceding case law and policies.
First, any incident that has not first been reported up through the military
chain of command is unlikely to be considered ripe and, thus, is unlikely
to be given consideration by the court, a point made more evident by the
presence of specific procedures and practices for handling religious
accommodation complaints. Second, if the incident is one that the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Maj. David E. Fitzkee & Cpt. Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the
Military: Navigating the Channel Between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1
(2007) (interpreting religious policy as Air Force Academy law professors, covering
much of the same ground, but in much more theoretical terms); Cdr. William A.
Wildhack III, Navy Chaplains at the Crossroads: Navigating the Intersection of
Free Speech, Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection, 51 NAVAL L.
REV. 217 (2005) (writing on religious freedom issues as pertaining to the naval
chaplaincy).
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military failed to remedy, it must not only be specific, but it must also
fall within a relatively narrow band of activities that cross the line from
mere religious practice and observation to coercion or denial of
accommodation. Finally, it would take an extraordinary argument in the
end to persuade the court to break its practice of deferring to the military,
and the desired ends may be more readily achievable by means of an act
of Congress or the executive. However, this does not mean that making
such an argument is wholly impossible or without merit.
A. Ripeness, Justiciability, and Exhaustion ofMilitary Remedies
The primary issue raised in the Justice Department's motion to
dismiss in both Specialists Hall's and Chalker's cases was one of
justiciability - specifically, whether or not a soldier could bring a civil
claim against the Department of Defense and/or his superior officers in
civilian federal court. In Chalker's suit, the Justice Department
concluded that under the test devised in Mindes v. Seaman,143 Chalker's
claims were barred because he had not first exhausted the available
intramilitary remedies. 144 The threshold test under Mindes for
contemplating review of an internal military decision requires a court to
determine "(1) whether the case involves an alleged violation of a
constitutional right, applicable statute or regulation, and (2) whether
intra-service remedies have been exhausted."1 4 5 The Mindes test is
essentially a military-specific ripeness standard, declaring that in any
case that the military has not had the opportunity to fully hear out, the
injury is still premature to be heard by the federal courts. 146 Chalker did
not meet this threshold test in any of the three incidents for which he was
seeking relief in his suit. His complaint stated only that he sought relief
from attendance at the events with "unsatisfactory" results, with no
143. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
144. Memorandum and Order, supra note 39, at 14-15. The district court in
Chalker applied the Mindes test because it was adopted as binding precedent within
all Tenth Circuit courts. Id. at 11. See Lindenau v. Alexander, 663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir.
1981).
145. Memorandum and Order, supra note 39, at 11 (citing Lindenau, 663 F. 2d
at 71).
146. Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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evidence of what intramilitary remedies had even been attempted.'4 7
Defendants countered with affidavit testimony from Chalker's
commander and chaplain, who testified that Chalker filed no religious
accommodation requests or Equal Opportunity complaints in relation to
the incidents named in the case, which the plaintiffs provided no
evidence to refute.148 Additionally, the court rejected Chalker's claim
that his case fell under a "futility exception" established by Walmer v.
United States Department of Defense,149 stating that the conclusory
allegations offered in the complaint were not enough to establish that the
appeals process would have been "clearly useless," as Walmer
.150
requires.
With this line of reasoning established in the failed Chalker
claim, the most pertinent question facing a future litigant should be
whether or not he or she has actually exhausted all intramilitary remedies
or can substantiate a claim that doing so would be futile. The best chance
a soldier has at a justiciable claim in the civilian courts is in an instance
in which he or she was faced with religious discrimination and sought a
remedy within the military setting, and his or her complaints were not
sufficiently dealt with in accordance with existing military policies.
Looking specifically at the case of Private Anthony Smith, for example,
there is some evidence that military remedies were available and
pursued. Smith also alleges, however, that those efforts were met with
a fair amount of resistance that led many soldiers to drop their claims. 152
That resistance could be seen as a failure to use proper military policy
and could lend credence to an exception under the Walmer futility rule,
particularly if supplemented by the additional evidence regarding a
pervasive evangelical Christian culture in the armed forces that would
feasibly contribute to such complaints being brushed off.' 53 In Private
147. Memorandum and Order, supra note 39, at 11.
148. Id. at 12. Chalker filed a request for religious accommodation, which he
received, and an Equal Opportunity complaint, which was determined to be
unfounded, in relation to a separate event not involved in this case. Id.
149. 835 F. Supp. 1307, 1310-11 (D. Kan. 1993).
150. Memorandum and Order, supra note 39, at 13.
151. See supra note 4-6 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 4-6 and accompanying text.
153. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 4-14, Chalker v. Gates, No. 08-CV-
2467-KHV-JPO (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/legalfiles/complain-sept08.pdf. It is
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Smith's case, given that the Army was conducting an investigation into
the incident, as of March 2011, it would appear that intramilitary
resolution was still within reach, and any litigation in this specific
instance would have to come after the investigation concluded, and the
findings or remedies offered were unsatisfactory to Smith based on how
they were handled. 154
B. The Nature of the Complaint
In addition to justiciability issues, a successful claim would have
to be not only based on a specific incident but also would have to be
either an act that crossed the line between religious accommodation and
religious coercion or an unjustified denial of religious accommodation.
Of the two possibilities, the former is the one chiefly pursued by the
Military Religious Freedom Foundation in its claims to date. The latter
category of action remains more or less untested, despite a missed
opportunity in the claims made by Specialist Jeremy Hall. 155
Religious coercion is the exclusive legal strategy pursued by
Specialist Chalker in his claims against the Department of Defense. His
initial complaint, filed in September 2008, cited three instances within
the preceding year of military functions that he was required to attend by
his chain of command that included "Christian sectarian prayers."1 56 This
was followed by an allegation that these instances are "evidence of a
pattern and practice of constitutionally impermissible promotions of
religious belief within the Department of Defense and the United States
important to separate Weinstein's more passionate incendiary charges, see Sharlet,
supra note 19, from the legitimate instances that are a cause for concern, see, e.g.,
Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 36.
154. The investigation was ordered by Lt. Gen. John E. "Jack" Sterling,
Training and Doctrine Command Chief of Staff, and while few details were offered,
Col. Thomas Collins, an Army spokesman at the Pentagon, is quoted as
acknowledging that the incident "is not consistent with Army policy." Gould, supra
note 1.
155. Hall's missed opportunity refers to his choosing to file suit based on free
speech and assembly rights, as opposed to a lack of Free Exercise accommodation
granted to his beliefs as an atheist and freethinker. See infra notes 170-75 and
accompanying text.
156. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 153, at 3.
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Army,,,57 and a ten-page list cataloging, in great detail, seventeen
additional instances of said patterns and practices from all parts of the
military, although Specialist Chalker did not directly experience all of
them. The court's dismissal notes that if all these instances were
treated as claims, Chalker would not have standing to make them as a
party, as they do not show a personal stake or personalized injury on the
part of Chalker. 15 9 This determination is firmly grounded in federal
standing doctrine, which prevents a case from being heard "when the
asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in a substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens."' 60 However, the court also
acknowledged that "plaintiffs offer the 'pattern and practice' allegations
(as well as allegations related to three specific events which Chalker
personally attended) [as evidence] to support their two causes of action,"
as opposed to separate and distinct claims for which they seek relief.161
While the court does not exclude the possibility that Chalker's
allegations may be "superfluous and irrelevant" to his cause of action,
they do not affect standing so long as they are accompanied by claims
that do demonstrate standing. 16 Including additional general claims
about religious influence in the military might not hurt future claims, but
it does not guarantee that they will be considered pertinent to an actual
specific claim, and they are useless without one. Thus, the primary focus
in a theoretical future claim should be on actual events experienced by
the plaintiff, with additional generalized claims being included more
specifically as evidence to support a futility claim under Walmer, if at all.
As for Chalker's personal claims of religious discrimination -
the sectarian Christian prayers - the District Court makes no comment on
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id. at 4-14. The allegations, single-spaced, comprise the majority of the
text of the sixteen-page complaint and include: "Religious Book Endorsements and
Official Military Emblems on Religious Books"; the presence of the Campus
Crusade for Christ Military Ministry at all major U.S. military training installations
and its involvement with the military chaplain program; and the evangelical
Christian influence on the Army "Strong Bonds" pre-deployment and post-
deployment family wellness and marriage training program. Id.
159. Memorandum and Order, supra note 39, at 8-9.
160. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at § 2.3.5 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
161. Memorandum and Order, supra note 39, at 9.
162. Id. at 10.
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their validity, having found his failure to exhaust military remedies as
sufficient grounds to dismiss his claim. However, previous cases and
guidelines on military prayer suggest that under certain conditions, the
presence of prayer at a mandatory event could be an event sufficient to
support a claim of infringement on religious freedoms. As previously
noted, the analysis of Major Benjamin in Army Lawyer explicitly states
that "invocations, prayers, and benedictions" are permissible at official
military and patriotic ceremonies, but it also provides the caveat that they
need to be "relatively short and non-denominational" and "not reference
divinity by any sectarian name (Jesus, Allah) but rather use 'generic'
terms.,,164 Chalker does not provide any more information on his claim
about the prayer itself, beyond the claim that it was "sectarian Christian"
in nature, 1s so more details would be needed to determine whether the
prayer violated Army guidelines. Additionally, while the decision on
prayer at VMI in Mellen v. Buntingl66 may lend some credence to
Chalker's argument, given that it concerns mealtime prayer,167 the
decisive factor in Mellon was the uniquely coercive educational
environment of VMI.168 This is not intended to suggest that the uniquely
coercive argument is exclusive to VMI, as will be discussed later. Private
Smith's case would be more likely to gain traction as a religious coercion
incident if not resolved by intramilitary means - the analysis in Army
Lawyer is very clear in its discussion of the Establishment Clause, stating
that "non-participation should not result in punishment."'1
6 9
163. Id. at 14-15.
164. Benjamin, supra note 128, at 17. See supra note 136 and accompanying
text.
165. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 153, at 3-4.
166. 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003).
167. One of Chalker's cited complaints is described as taking place at a
barbeque as opposed to a military ceremony. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief,
supra note 153, at 3.
168. Mellon, 327 F.3d 355. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
169. Benjamin, supra note 128, at 16. See supra note 132 and accompanying
text. This analysis reflects specific regulatory prohibitions against proselytizing by
the chaplaincy. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAM. No.165-16, MORAL
LEADERSHIP/VALUES STAGES OF THE FAMILY LIFE CYCLE 1 para. 1-2 (1987)
("Chaplain instructors have a responsibility to avoid any action, which would tend to
confuse [leadership and ethics] training with religious instruction."). But see Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 49, at 123 ("[Proselytizing] arises within a vacuum of regulation,
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Things become more interesting when we turn back to the
dropped complaint by Specialist Jeremy Hall. Unlike Chalker's, Hall's
complaints did not concern mandatory attendance at an event containing
sectarian Christian practice but rather a commanding officer's disruption
of an atheist event that he organized. 170 While the complaint states as its
causes of action a denial of Hall's free assembly and speech rights,
denial of his right to be free of government-sponsored religion, and
denial of equal protection given the freedom of religious groups to hold
meetings,171 the complaint does not attempt to assert a cause of action for
infringement of Hall's free exercise of religion. While atheism is
commonly believed to be the absence of religious faith, in this case
Hall's activities had all the organizational characteristics of any other
faith requiring accommodation within the armed forces. 17 The event was
designed to gather a group of likeminded persons, and it had the backing
of an established national and even intramilitary organization dedicated
to its philosophy - the Military Association of Atheists and
Freethinkers. 17 Hall presumably sought this gathering for the same
reasons other religious gatherings are sought while deployed - to
discuss common viewpoints and find comfort in community in the
context of intense military combat operations. Indeed, Specialist Hall
and even of official guidance, covering the chaplain's engagement with service
members.").
170. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 5-6, MRFF v. Gates, No. 07-
2444-JWL (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2007), available at
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/legalfiles/complain.pdf. See also Banerjee,
supra note 21 (providing an account of the same incident in The New York Times).
171. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 170, at 7.
172. Atheism has been recognized as a religion for Free Exercise purposes,
most recently by the Seventh Circuit in August 2005. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry,
419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Court has adopted a broad definition of
'religion' that includes non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as theistic ones.").
See also McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) ("The touchstone for
our analysis is the principle that the First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.")
(internal quotations omitted); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) ("But
when the underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the
Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience
protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or
none at all.").
173. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
2011] 741
went about the same procedures to conduct and advertise for his meeting
as other religious groups would, gaining the permission of an Army
114chaplain to do so.
If Hall's action was merely one of free speech through public
assembly, the military has a fairly established basis under Orloff and
Parker to claim necessity to curtail his actions. 17 5 In terms of religious
accommodation, however, if Hall's event had already been found to
qualify for accommodation, then its disruption, had Hall pursued his
complaint through the military's internal procedures, would in theory be
handled in the same manner as if a Jewish, Muslim, or Christian event
had been interrupted and met with resistance from a superior officer. It
would be a violation of policy and a denial of religious accommodation
that Hall and every soldier is afforded as a member of the military.
Additionally, under the view that atheism is deserving of the same free
exercise accommodations as any other religion, atheist soldiers would be
entitled to being excused from any instances of more than ceremonial
religious observance as part of a mandatory military event - again,
questionable for prayer, but fairly certain in the case of a Spiritual
Fitness Concert.
C. Overcoming Military Necessity
Even if a soldier had a legitimate cause of action, either of
religious coercion or a denial of accommodations for the free exercise of
religion, and the soldier exhausted all intramilitary options without a
satisfactory resolution (or somehow had proven those efforts to be
futile), there is no guarantee that the federal courts, up to and including
the United States Supreme Court, would find in the soldier's favor.
Military necessity looms large over any case concerning a soldier's First
Amendment rights. The courts have only seen fit to overrule military
necessity in the narrowest of circumstances, as shown in Hartmann, in
174. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 170, at 4.
175. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
176. Here, there is admittedly some question as to whether the permission of a
chaplain qualifies as proper approval. Nevertheless, Hall has a presumption of
accommodation in his favor, and seems to fulfill the criteria of sincerity, basis in
belief, and minimal detrimental impact on mission. See Benjamin, supra note 128,
at 14.
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order to prevent the military from regulating civilian conduct (and
religious conduct to boot).177 Even the religious freedom enjoyed by
members of the military today has its roots not in the courts but in a
congressional response to the Supreme Court's denial of religious
freedom under the reasoning of military necessity in Goldman.178
Furthermore, the December 2010 repeal of the military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy, an officially supported discriminatory practice that
had long been defended on a military necessity rationale - specifically
that the freedom for soldiers to publicly express their sexual orientation
would adversely affect military readiness - took place not in the courts
but in the United States Congress.179 That said, while public activism and
congressional lobbying for hearings or legislation may end up being a
more effective means of obtaining greater accountability for military
religious freedom, there is still a case to be made before the court for
overriding the military necessity argument in defense of the right to
personal beliefs.
While the crack in the wall of military necessity that Hartmann
made was a tiny one, it is nonetheless critical that there are in fact some
areas where the imposition of military regulations over civilian rights is
not necessary. Granted, exempting civilians who provide childcare to
military families from military regulations is very different from
exempting certain areas of the lives of enlisted soldiers from military
177. See Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 983-86 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
religious practices in on-base daycare did not create government entanglement with
religion, and restricting it was an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment
rights).
178. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2010) (allowing the wearing of "neat and conservative"
religious garments while in uniform, unless "the wearing of the item would interfere
with the performance of the member's military duties"). See supra notes 96-101 and
accompanying text.
179. Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670 (codified as 10 U.S.C. §
654 (1993)), repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away 'Don't Ask,
Don't Tell', NYTIMES.COM Dec. 23, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 25279469;
Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon Sees Little Risk in Allowing Gay Men and Women to
Serve Openly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at A21 (noting that Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates stated one of the key reasons for pushing for repeal in Congress was to
avoid a fight in the courts, and the repeal being "imposed immediately by judicial
fiat," suggesting some uncertainty as to whether military necessity would be upheld
in this case if it had come before the Court).
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regulation. The latter is a far greater hole in the military necessity wall.
That does not mean, however, that it is not worth pursuing. The rationale
in Parker v. Levy for giving deference to the military in restricting First
Amendment freedoms is based on the "fundamental necessity for
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline."
80
This need is reflected in military policy on religious freedom stemming
from Department of Defense directive, striking a balance that allows
soldiers to possess and express their own religious beliefs to the extent
that this does not interfere with obedience, discipline, and the mission at
hand. One might even imagine that Justice Scalia, author of the
Employment Division v. Smith opinion, would be pleased to know that no
man in our armed forces is being permitted "to become a law unto
himself."l 82 The problem arises when policies on paper are not executed
in practice, either because complaints from soldiers are not being
handled properly, or because a culture has developed in which soldiers
see no benefit in protest. When this takes place, the danger in granting
too much deference to the military to manage itself becomes as severe as
the danger when it is not given enough.
Similarly to Hartmann, the Mellen case opens a small but critical
window from which to make a case against military necessity in religious
freedom issues.' The prayers conducted at VMI, aside from being of a
particularly overt Christian nature, were stopped by judicial intervention
primarily due to the culture at VMI, which "emphasizes the detailed
regulation of conduct and the indoctrination of a strict moral code,"' 8 4
leaving it open to the same line of reasoning applied to school prayer
cases. Although VMI's adversative educational methods are certainly
more severe than standard military levels of discipline, the armed forces
nonetheless are coercive in nature and, thus, capable of unnecessarily
denying their members' liberties. William J. Dobosh, Jr., an Army judge
180. 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
181. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
182. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 167 (1878)).
183. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
184. Id. at 371.
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advocate, made this argument forcefully. Dobosh asserted that the
same military-civilian divide that justifies the military necessity doctrine
feeds an ongoing military socialization process which "constantly
directs, forms, and develops the actions and perspectives of its
members."l86 Because of this, "[t]he Army's social environment presents
particular dangers of coerced religious activity and the perception of
governmental religious endorsement."' 8 7 Maintaining close regulation of
the military's treatment of religious freedom and allowing for a civilian
judicial fallback to keep the military accountable does not threaten the
discipline and order necessary to provide a national security force; in
Dobosh's eyes it would "signify the Army's desire to have all of its
soldiers, regardless of personal religious beliefs, feel like fully accepted
members of the Army team" while preserving their dignity and
morale.' When weighing military necessity and personal liberties, in
the case of religious freedom, the theoretical disciplinary benefits of the
status quo are simply too greatly outweighed by the costs.
CONCLUSION
The struggle to embrace religious pluralism while maintaining a
uniquely American set of values and ideals has endured throughout our
history, from the earliest Protestant colonists fleeing religious
persecution in Europe,189 to the embrace of Catholic and Jewish
immigrant populations in the early 20th century,190 to the ongoing fear
185. William J. Dobosh, Jr., Coercion in the Ranks: The Establishment Clause
Implications of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WiS. L.
REV. 1493, 1526-27 (2006).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1527-28.
188. Id. at 1560.
189. See, e.g., Library of Congress, Religion and the Founding of the
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/religion.html (last visited
Mar. 26, 2011) (detailing in an online exhibition the colonization of North America
for religious refuge).
190. See, e.g., CHESTER GILLIS, ROMAN CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA 68-94
(1999) (detailing the Catholic experience from the beginning of the 20th Century to
the advent of Vatican II); Jonathan D. Sarna & Jonathan Golden, The American
Jewish Experience in the Twentieth Century: Antisemitism and Assimilation, NAT'L
HUMAN. CTR., Oct. 2000, http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org
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and suspicion of Muslim Americans in the wake of extremist terrorist
attacks embodied by the "Ground Zero mosque" controversy. 1 This
struggle is only amplified in the military setting, where the need to
establish a unified sense of mission and discipline in preparation for the
battlefield runs deep into the hearts and minds of each individual
member of the armed forces. It is because of this need that the courts
have granted the military greater latitude and deference to restrict First
Amendment freedoms in the military setting, and those electing to serve
understand that in doing so, they consent to certain restrictions.
At the same time, we must not forget that our soldiers remain
citizens, and while their freedoms of speech and expression may be
heavily regulated, they should remain free to hold their own personal
opinions and spiritual beliefs. A heavily coercive military culture in
which expression of minority faiths - including the absence of religious
faith - is not adequately accommodated, in tandem with evangelical
Christianity being given a level of pervasiveness that transcends
accommodation and enters into the realms of persuasion and coercion,
runs dangerously close to one in which our men and women in uniform
are restricted not just in how to express their beliefs but also in how they
can and cannot think.
The litigation presented to date by the Military Religious
Freedom Foundation may have been premature. Eager to make a splash
in the courts and convinced of the totally dominant influence of
evangelical Christianity at all levels of the military, Mikey Weinstein
went all-in on the claims of Specialists Hall and Chalker before either
attempted to redress the issue with a formal Equal Opportunity
complaint.192 On the other hand, while both claims have at least the
potential to constitute valid infringements of religious freedom, there is
no evidence short of the lack of documented complaints that the current
religious freedom policies are being implemented properly. The pressure
/tserve/twenty/tkeyinfo/jewishexp.htm (providing an overview of discrimination and
acceptance of Jewish Americans in the 20th Century).
191. This is the (admittedly inaccurate) name given in the press to the 2010
controversy over plans to construct a Muslim Community Center in the same
neighborhood where the Twin Towers once stood. See Romesh Ratnesar, Ground
Zero: Exaggerating the Jihadist Threat, TIME.CoM, Aug. 18, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2011400,00.html.
192. See supra notes 25 and 148 and accompanying text.
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to not file complaints experienced by Private Anthony Smith and his
fellow soldiers indicate at least some efforts to suppress such conflicts.
Meanwhile, large-scale and explicitly Christian events continue
to be held on military bases, attracting controversy.19 3 Recently released
survey data from the United States Air Force Academy indicates a
persistent sense of religious coercion and discrimination.1 94 And the
future only holds more challenges to religious expression in the military,
not just from minority religious groups and atheists, but from
conservative evangelical Christians as well. In the lead-up to the repeal
of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," conservative religious groups vocally
questioned how chaplains who disagree with homosexuality as a matter
of religious faith would be accommodated,1 9 5 and they have continued to
193. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, North Carolina: Group Protests Planned
Religious Rally at Fort Bragg, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A16 (describing
opposition to an evangelistic rally to be held at Fort Bragg in North Carolina by the
Billy Graham Evangelistic Association); Press Release, Freedom From Religion
Foundation, FOlA Documents Army's 'Rock the Fort' Subsidy (Jan. 25, 2011),
available at http://www.ffrf.org/news/releases/ffrf-foia-documents-armys-rock-the-
fort-subsidy/. The Freedom from Religion Foundation described the Fort Bragg
event:
Army organizers of the event apparently spent over $6,450 of
public money on food, benefitting local pastors, volunteers and
guests. Hotel rooms for 39 "guests" cost taxpayers $7,168, and
"escort vans" for artists cost $1,360. Apparently, one "worship
service leader" was given a $1,500 honorarium. The Army
spent over $12,000 on advertising the event.
Id.
194. See Jonathan Easley, Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs Addresses
Diversity Issues, COL. SPRINGS BUS. J., Nov. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR
22910428 (noting a survey that revealed "[a]lmost half of the cadets polled said that
there is a low tolerance for non-Christian beliefs" in the Academy). See also Scott
Fontaine, Group: Cadets Pressed to Conform on Religion, AIR FORCE TIMES, Oct.
11, 2010, at 25, available at 2010 WLNR 21319640 (describing the Air Force
Academy's initial resistance to releasing the survey, and the Military Religious
Freedom Foundation's pressures to publish the data, as well as reports of students
posing as evangelicals to avoid persecution by classmates).
195. See Daniel Blomberg, Editorial, If Gays Serve Openly, Will Chaplains
Suffer?, USA TODAY, July 12, 2010, at A9, available at 2010 WLNR 13974194
(presenting arguments in opposition to the repeal by litigation counsel for the
Alliance Defense Fund, a conservative religious liberty organization); Tom Breen,
Retired Chaplains: Preserve 'Don't Ask', WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2010, at A2
(detailing efforts by former chaplains to petition President Obama to retain the
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advocate on behalf of conservative chaplains as the military prepares for
the acceptance of openly gay and lesbian soldiers.' So while
establishing and maintaining a vision of religious pluralism that is
compatible with military discipline is indeed a challenge even more
formidable than maintaining religious pluralism in civilian society, it is
not one to be ignored or pushed under the rug by anybody with the power
to address it - not by the Pentagon, not by Congress, and not by the
courts.
policy, noting that clergy will be ineligible to serve in the chaplaincy if their church
withdraws support, as some are threatening to do); The Rt. Rev. V. Gene Robinson,
Letter to the Editor, Lifting 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Won't Threaten Religious
Freedom, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2010, at A8, available at 2010 WLNR 15513660
(responding to the Blomberg editorial as the first openly gay priest elected bishop in
the worldwide Anglican Communion). A Washington Post article described some of
the protests to the repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell":
The Southern Baptist Convention, the Roman Catholic
Church, the Orthodox Church in America, the Presbyterian
Church in America, and the Rabbinical Alliance of America
have issued statements or written to the Obama administration
this year with their concerns that repealing "don't ask, don't
tell" could force their chaplains to choose between serving
God and serving the military.
Breen, supra note 195.
196. See Ann Rodgers, Chaplains in Military Fear Fallout from Repeal of
'Don't Ask, Don't Tell', PITr. POST-GAZETrE, Feb. 27, 2011, at Al, available at
2011 WLNR 3851137 (detailing the efforts of organizations such as the North
American Mission Board to assure that conservative chaplains are not pressured to
change their beliefs in the training process for the repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy).
